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THE MEANING OF DA UBER T AND WHAT
THAT MEANS FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE
Randolph N. Jonakait*
I. THE FLEXIBLE INQUIRY
Daubert's effect on forensic science is unclear because the opin-
ion is unclear.' The Daubert Court did start blazing a useful path by
stating that before scientific testimony is admitted, the trial court
must be convinced that "the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and ... that [the] reasoning or meth-
odology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' 2  But the
Court's trailblazing was incomplete and often misleading.
For example, Daubert is premised on unarticulated assumptions.
The opinion commands trial courts to determine whether something
is "scientific," not whether it is physics, chemistry, biology, epidemi-
ology, psychology, accidentology, clinical ecology, or forensic science.
This can be done only if there are general standards and methods
applicable to all fields of science that distinguish genuine science from
pseudoscience.3 Furthermore, the Court's command can only be fol-
lowed if trial courts can understand those standards and use them to
identify real science.4 These premises, however, were not stated. It
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2 Id. at 2796.
3 See Lee Loevinger, Science and Legal Rules of Evidence: A Review of Galileo's Revenge:
Junk Science in the Courtroom, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 487, 500 (1992) (book review) ("While
there are innumerable specialized fields in science today, and while knowledge in one field does
not necessarily transfer to another field, there are, nevertheless, general standards applicable to
all fields of science that distinguish genuine science from pseudo-science and quack science.");
cf W.I.B. BEVERIDGE, THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 19 (Vintage Books 1950):
Science as we know it to-day [sic] may be said to date from the introduction of
the experimental method during the Renaissance. Nevertheless, important as ex-
perimentation is in most branches of science, it is not appropriate to all types of
research. It is not used, for instance, in descriptive biology, observational ecology
or in most forms of clinical research in medicine. However, investigations of this
latter type make use of many of the same principles. The main difference is that
hypotheses are tested by the collection of information from phenomena which oc-
cur naturally instead of those that are made to take place under experimental
conditions.
4 Cf Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific Evi-
dence, I SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 19, 27 (1993):
If lawyers and judges hope to apply the new Daubert test rationally, they will
thus have to learn more about what distinguishes science from other forms of
knowledge-what it is that makes science scientific. Science defies precise defini-
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would have been better if they had been to help insure that trial courts
would begin their analyses at the proper starting point.
Even if, however, trial courts start at the same place, it is un-
likely they will follow the same course. The opinion fails to provide
meaningful guidance on how to follow the path; no firm method for
making the determination was given. On one level, Daubert gave pro-
nouncements, such as" 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science,"' and the "overarching subject is the scien-
tific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission."6 These generali-
ties were followed by a mandate to undertake a "flexible" inquiry.7
This second level, which should have outlined a clear trail, however,
was muddy. The result may be that Daubert has little effect on future
litigation. That, of course, is often the result of such flexible tests.
The wonder of flexible inquiries is that they can so often be made
to fit just about any predetermined conclusion-practically any two-
month-old can be manipulated into an infant's clothing. The skeptic
may feel that flexible standards seldom produce results; instead, they
are devices merely used to justify conclusions reached on other
grounds. Initial reactions to Daubert indicate that its flexible inquiry
is meaningless. As this symposium reflects, all sides claim victory.
Such universal celebration indicates that all believe they can favorably
apply the announced standard to a given situation.
The real question, however, is not whether advocates and aca-
demics can interpret Daubert to justify the results they desire, but
whether judges will do the same. Will the opinion truly drive deci-
sions, or will judges continue to reach the same conclusions, but now
simply justify them differently? While it is too early to reach a defini-
tive conclusion,' the flexible exploration mandated by the Court is so
vague and inadequate that it is difficult to envision how trial court
discretion will be meaningfully cabined. Although Daubert suggested
that trial courts examine four factors,9 it was only a suggestion.10
tion, but even nonscientists can learn enough about it to distinguish valid from
invalid claims.
5 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
6 Id. at 2797.
7 Id.
8 In the cases concerning scientific evidence since Daubert was decided, none that I have
looked at indicate a different result was reached than would have been without Daubert. So
far, at least, Daubert has compelled no new results. The records in these cases, however, were
all apparently made before the decision. The true effect of Daubert cannot be assessed until
more time passes.
9 See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2796-97 (listing factors including testability, peer review and
publication, general acceptance, and error rate).
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More important, Daubert's guidance on how to use the listed factors
is not only inadequate, it is sometimes downright misleading.
Daubert was most enlightening in its discussion regarding peer
review and publication."I The Court suggested how this factor relates
to a trial court's reliability analysis. "[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of
the scientific community is a component of 'good science,' in part be-
cause it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology
will be detected."' 12 Peer review and publication, then, are not impor-
tant in themselves, but in what they reveal about the likelihood of
methodological flaws having been detected and, presumably, cor-
rected. Consequently, even if the science has been peer reviewed and
published, if these processes were unlikely to lead to the discovery and
correction of problems, the reliability of the science is suspect. Con-
versely, if the trial court becomes convinced that such detection and
alteration have occurred even without the scientific community's
scrutiny, the testimony still could be admitted.' 3
While the Court gave some meaningful explication of the peer
review and publication prong, its discussion of other aspects of the
flexible inquiry was much less satisfactory. For example, Daubert
suggests that trial courts use the Frye" test once again as part of its
rubbery examination. 5 The Court states that general acceptance is
not necessary for a reliability assessment, but that such acceptance
"can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible"
and the lack of it "may properly be viewed with skepticism."' 6 The
Court's discussion, however, does not address problems that have be-
deviled past applications of Frye. How widespread must the accept-
ance be for it to be "general"? How should a court go about defining
the relevant scientific community? More important, what does it
mean that a lack of general acceptance "may" allow a trial court to
view the scientific evidence with skepticism? If lack of general accept-
10 Id. at 2796 ("Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test.").
'' Id. at 2797 (The trial court should consider "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication.").
12 Id.
13 While Daubert indicated that publication was not a necessary ingredient for a determi-
nation of reliability, the Court suggested limited circumstances for when it might be expected
that the science would not be disseminated: "Some propositions ...are too particular, too
new, or of too limited interest to be published." Id.
14 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (" '[G]eneral acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry."); see Maiorana v. National Gypsum Co., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("The decision in Daubert kills Frye and then resurrects its ghost.").
16 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
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ance leads to skepticism in some instances, why not in all? If not in
all, why in some and not others?
The opinion also listed an "error rate factor" as part of the flexi-
ble inquiry. "[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the
court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error,
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique's operation."' 7 Once again, however, crucial questions were not
addressed. For example, what if the error rate is unknown? Does it
matter if it is ascertainable, but no one has bothered to ascertain it?
What does it mean for the reliability of a scientific technique if its
error rate is not knowable? If the error rate is known, does it matter?
If the error rate is less than fifty percent, does it satisfy a preponder-
ance of the evidence notion of reliability? Or does the error rate have
to be small enough to conform to "scientific" notions of confidence?
Is there a connection between error rates and the statistical tests that
normally require scientists to reach a ninety-five percent confidence
level?' 8
Perhaps most disturbing, however, is the Court's treatment of
the first factor discussed. "Ordinarily, a key question to be answered
in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been)
tested."' 9 Strikingly strange here is the introductory word, "ordina-
rily," which implies that in some extraordinary situation something
can be "scientific" even though it cannot be (or has not been) tested.
What those possible unusual circumstances might be are left unde-
fined. The Court does cite three references,20 but they do not clarify
17 Id. (citation omitted). An inquiry about the existence and maintenance of standards is
not likely to be meaningful if trial courts follow the Supreme Court's lead here. See Paul C.
Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 1999,
2022 (1994) (criticizing Daubert's reliance on the voice print cases).
18 The Court gives no indication how the normal statistical tests of science should affect
admissibility. Cf CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOV'T, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEET-
ING CHALLENGES 37 (1993) ("[M]ust all scientific studies on which an expert relies meet the
95 percent confidence level that is often used by scientists to reject the possibility that chance
alone accounted for observed differences? Is a lower standard compatible with the objectives
of the preponderance of proof standard in civil litigation?").
19 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
20 See id. at 2796-97. The Court first cited Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Suffi-
ciency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992) ("Scientific methodology today is based on
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology
is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."). The Court then suggested
that the reader also see CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)
("[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test.")
and KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
[Vol. 15:21032106
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the Court's language. Indeed, they contradict it. The sources indi-
cate that scientific methodology is always tested, not that it ordinarily
is.2 And that is what the Court should have recognized.
II. WHAT DAUBERT OUGHT TO MEAN
A. Testability Factor
Daubert treats falsifiability or testability as a factor similar to the
others in its flexible inquiry. The Court was wrong. The defining
touchstone of science is a testable proposition that is tested. To be a
scientist requires finding ways to test hypotheses that are generated;
otherwise the "science" is just an exercise in fantasy.22
In other words, scientists seeking to advance knowledge about
the empirical world do not rely on assertions or convictions or logic,
but rather upon encounters with the empirical world.23 Scientists do
this not just by creating testable or falsifiable propositions, but also by
analyzing and testing them.24 Most scientific hypotheses are proven
to be wrong.25 Their creation is essential, but their rigorous testing is
even more crucial.2 6
The analysis and testing is not limited to one form,2 7 but the pro-
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its fal-
sifiability, or refutability, or testability.").
21 See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
22 See PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND,
OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 33 (1993) ("In attempting to instantiate the Darwinian
schemata, biologists are compelled to advance hypotheses about the historical development of
life, and it is incumbent on them to specify ways of testing these hypotheses ... if they are to
avoid the charge that evolutionary biology is simply an exercise in fantasizing."); see also BEV-
ERIDGE, supra note 3, at 63 ("Hypothesis is the most important mental technique of the inves-
tigator, and its main function is to suggest new experiments or new observations.").
23 Cf KITCHER, supra note 22, at 306 ("[W]e work our way free of the mistakes of earlier
[scientific] generations through further encounters with nature.").
24 Sir Karl Popper, distinguished philosopher of science, explained: "A scientist . . . puts
forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. In the field of the
empirical sciences .... he constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them against
experience by observation and experiment." KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC Dis-
COVERY 27 (Harper Torchbooks 1965); see also Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific
Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 622 (1988) (quoting Frederick Suppe, Afterword to THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 650 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977)) ("The goal for
scientists is ito obtain systematic knowledge that provides understanding of the world we live
in.' Scientists evaluate their ideas against criteria that involve testability, objectivity, impartial-
ity, and a belief in a deep and obvious connection between evidence and reason.").
25 BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 79-80 ("Most hypotheses prove to be wrong whatever their
origin may be.... W. H. George points out that even with men of genius, with whom the birth
rate of hypotheses is very high, it only just manages to exceed the death rate.").
26 Id. at 80 ("The productive research worker is usually one who is not afraid to venture
and risk going astray, but who makes a rigorous test for error before reporting his findings.").
27 John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1970 n.16 (1987)
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cess is always dependent on skepticism and doubt-a skepticism that
promotes inquiry, experimentation, and validation that can remove
that doubt.2" The scientist looks at hypotheses and determines how
the ideas could be proven wrong by reproducible experiments or stud-
ies.29 Only after the possible shortcomings of the assertion are tested
and the hypothesis has not been proven false does a scientific idea
emerge.3 °
("Of course, there is no one scientific method. The techniques used to develop and test hy-
potheses necessarily vary for different disciplines.").
28 Cf Dirk Eshleman, Note, Different Standards and Conflicting Results.: A Re-Evaluation
of the Frye Test for Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectro-
graphic Evidence Introduction, 5 REV. LITIG. 327, 364 (1986) ("Science thrives on doubt.
Scientific skepticism promotes inquiry and experimentation, and, hence, advances our under-
standing of the world around us.").
29 See POPPER, supra note 24, at 40-41.
Theories are . . . never empirically verifiable .... [But a system is] empirical or
scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations
suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as
criterion of demarcation .... [Ilt must be possible for an empirical scientific system
to be refuted by experience.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also H.J. Walls, Whither Forensic Science?, 6
MED. Sci. & L. 183, 187 (1966):
Modern philosophers of science ... have pointed out that a scientific hypothesis
can, logically, never be proved, only disproved. However often the result of an
experiment supports an hypothesis, we cannot be logically certain that some un-
known and unexpected cause will not produce a contrary result the next time, and
if that does happen, and if the unexpected result cannot be explained in some way
consistent with the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is in strict logic disproved. If
all the evidence supports it, it is provisionally accepted, but ... it is never free from
the risk of being upset by one reliable incompatible observation .... That . . . is
why the scientific world picture . . . is always provisional, never final, always
changing.
Cf BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 118 ("Generalisations can never be proved.").
In addition, experiments must be reproducible to be part of scientific proof.
Only when certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as is the
case with repeatable experiments, can our observations be tested-in principle-by
anyone. We do not take even our own observations.., until we have repeated and
tested them. Only by such repetitions can we convince ourselves that we are not
dealing with a mere isolated "coincidence" ....
POPPER, supra note 24, at 45; see also BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 23 ("The essence of any
satisfactory experiment is that it should be reproducible."); cf Lee Loevinger, Standards of
Proof in Science and Law, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 323, 342 (1992):
Science has the advantage in this respect of dealing generally with events that,
being replicable, occur in series of like events, thus justifying the expression of
judgments in statistical terms. Law, on the other hand, deals with unique cases
that are not subject to frequency calculations.
30 See Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO.
L.J. 1341, 1342-43 (1987).
A scientist can come up with a hypothesis about the natural world through any
process at all-systematic study, inspired speculation, or fevered dreams. But that
hypothesis must ultimately be subject to controlled tests, reproducible by others.
Only if the tests support the hypothesis can the hypothesis be accepted.
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Daubert's flexible framework fails, then, by suggesting that
testability or falsifiability is not an absolute. The Court should have
made clear that an assertion is science if, and only if, it can be tested
or falsified. 31 Furthermore, a testable proposition can be relied upon
if, and only if, it has been rigorously tested. 32 Or, as the Nobel laure-
ate Luis Alvarez cautioned fellow scientists, "[o]nly trust what you
can prove."
33
This rigorous testing has a basic rule. To be scientific, controls
must be employed.
This is the most fundamental commandment in the canon of
experimental technique. To reach an unimpeachable conclusion
Id.; see also Black, supra note 24, at 623 (quoting Frederick Suppe, Afterword to THE STRUC-
TURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 706 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977)):
Observation and experimentation are used to find shortcomings, to determine how
to make improvements, and "to discover how to eliminate known artificialities,
distortions, oversimplifications, and errors in the descriptions, explanations, and
predictions of reality that the theory affords." Only after a theory has survived a
period of this kind of testing, review and refinement can it be used without signifi-
cant questions, and even then, it remains open to renewed doubt.
Cf POPPER, supra note 24, at 42:
(W]hat characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsifica-
tion, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the
lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by com-
parison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival.
Cf State v. Davis, 742 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. 1987) (rejecting the testimony of a graphologist
who formed opinions about personality and mental states from handwriting and concluded
that, "graphology is not a science because its results are neither verifiable nor repeatable").
31 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed bewilderment as to the concept of "falsifiability." "I
defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant
when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect
some of them will be, too." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
Falsifiability, however, is not so alien to a trial attorney. It is akin to the kind of thinking
in which many lawyers who deal with factual disputes routinely engage. For example, if a
client tells his attorney that he could not have committed the crime because he was at his
regular post office job, the good attorney immediately tries to determine what type of informa-
tion might tend to corroborate this assertion. If what the client says is true, there ought to be
employment records, pay stubs, recollections of coworkers and carpoolers, and the like. If
such information does not support the alibi, the defense attorney knows that the prosecution
will have a greater chance of convincing the jury that the alibi is false. In other words, the
attorney looks for information that tends to corroborate or falsify the claimed defense. In a
sense, trial attorneys regularly create falsifiable hypotheses (if the alibi is correct, then a time
card should show the client at work), and then look for the information that might prove the
hypothesis false.
32 Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. &
POL'y REV. 1, 16 (1993) ("[S]cientists subscribe to and are actuated by rigorous standards of
empirical investigation and proof; to deviate from these standards is to be deemed profession-
ally incompetent, or worse.").
33 GARY TAUBES, BAD SCIENCE: THE SHORT LIFE AND WEIRD TIMES OF COLD FUSION
197 (1993) (quoting Luis Alvarez).
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establishing the cause of an effect, run controls. E. Bright Wilson,
Jr., in his classic 1952 volume An Introduction to Scientific Re-
search, described controls as "similar test specimens which are sub-
jected to as nearly as possible the same treatment as the objects of
the experiment, except for the change in the variable under
study.
'
9
34
Without controls, the cause of an outcome cannot be determined. As
E. Bright Wilson also said: "If one doubts the necessity for controls,
reflect on the statement: 'It has been conclusively demonstrated by
hundreds of experiments that the beating of tom-toms will restore the
sun after an eclipse.' ,35 While the proper methodology of controlled
experiments, tests, or inquiries may vary from field to scientific field,
such controlled experiments, tests, or inquiries are required if the en-
deavor is to be considered science.3 6
Since Daubert commands trial courts to determine that scientific
testimony is indeed scientific and, therefore, based on a reliable meth-
odology, then testability and testing with rigorous, controlled experi-
ments are not merely factors in a balancing task. They are absolutes.
Without them, it is not science. Daubert's approach, however, to the
other factors was basically correct. Those factors are not essential,
but generally can shed light on whether the testimony is based on
trustworthy methods.
B. Peer Review and Publication Factor
Peer review and publication can help determine whether the sci-
34 Id. at 120-21 (footnote omitted); see also BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 20:
The "controlled experiment" is one of the most important concepts in biologi-
cal experimentation. In this there are two or more similar groups[;] . . . one, the
"control" group, is held as a standard for comparison, while the other, the "test"
group, is subjected to some procedure whose effect one wishes to determine. The
groups are usually formed by "randomisation," that is to say, by assigning individ-
uals to one group or the other by drawing lots or by some other means that does
not involve human discrimination. The traditional method of experimentation is
to have the groups as similar as possible in all respects except in the one variable
factor under investigation, and to keep the experiment simple.
Compare John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 502 (1986):
There is consensus among social scientists of all disciplines that research must
possess "validity." That is, the methods used in research must be able to justify
the conclusions drawn by the investigator .... To have "high" validity, a study
must rule out, or "control for," competing hypotheses that may account for an
observed state of affairs.
35 TAUBES, supra note 33, at 162.
36 Cf BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 25 ("Unless the basic needs of the controlled experi-
ment can be satisfied it is better to abandon the attempt .... Most of the experiments have
proved nothing [when] the controls were not strictly comparable.").
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ence has been adequately validated. As the Daubert Court recog-
nized, "the scrutiny of the scientific community ... increases the
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.""'
The investigating scientist herself can seldom, if ever, be confident
that she has thought of all the possible alternative causes for the ob-
served phenomenon or properly tested for those possibilities.38 Two
heads are better than one; a collection of scientific heads are even bet-
ter. The scientific community, with its greater collective wisdom,
knowledge, and experience can often suggest alternative causes and
experiments that have not occurred to the investigator doing the ini-
tial research.
Peer review and publication increase the likelihood that many
knowledgeable, skeptical, and probing scientists have examined the
data and conclusions. Without this scientific examination, it is almost
impossible to conclude that a hypothesis has been adequately tested.
A trial court should consider science that has not been peer reviewed
and published as science whose methodology has probably not been
scrutinized closely and, therefore, whose reliability has not been es-
tablished. But rigorous, empirical validation is the touchstone-not
peer review and publication. A court, then, can still find the science
reliable if, by some unusual circumstance, the scientific community
has still scrutinized the methodology or propositions even though the
science has not entered the normal streams of scientific intercourse.
On the other hand, a court should not leap to the conclusion that
because the science has been peer reviewed or published, it has been
rigorously scrutinized. Peer review is hardly a perfect system-it is
often less than demanding because scientists are busy or because of
conflicts of interest.39
Furthermore, strict scrutiny does not necessarily follow from the
fact of publication. Too much scientific literature is published for
scientists to scrutinize most of it. As the philosopher of science David
Hull noted:
[S]cientists spend very little time in haphazard reading of the liter-
ature, even the literature in their own area of expertise. There is
much too much published for that to be a productive activity. In-
37 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
38 Cf David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, Defense Perspective, I SHEPARD'S EXPERT &
Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 59, 61 (1993) ("[Ain expert should only be permitted to identify an agent as
the cause of an injury or illness under Rule 403 if he or she has studied and discounted alterna-
tive causes.").
39 Cf. TAUBES, supra note 33, at 14 ("It is considered in poor taste, to point out that the
experimental techniques of a competitor leave something to be desired. That would also be
inviting the competitor to return the favor someday."); see also id. at 35.
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stead they scan the literature looking for findings that bear on their
own research."
For these and other reasons, the work of others is often not
checked, and some suggest that only a fraction of verifications or refu-
tations are meaningful.
Scientists cannot spend very much time checking the work of other
scientists if they themselves are to make contributions. They re-
serve checking for those findings that bear most closely on their
own research, chiefly those that threaten it. Because different
scientists are committed to different views, the checking that goes
on in science rarely degenerates into empty show. When scientists
refute their own favorite hypotheses or their opponents confirm
them, one can place considerable confidence in the results.4"
Peer review and publication, then, can bear on the crucial ques-
tion of whether the opinion's foundation is based on testable proposi-
tions that have been adequately tested. Only in extraordinary
situations is it possible to conclude that sufficient testing has occurred
in the absence of peer review and publication. The existence of peer
review and publication, however, do not necessarily mean that the
technique or theory has been rigorously scrutinized by the scientific
community.
C. General Acceptance Factor
Daubert's general acceptance factor, which overlaps significantly
40 DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SO-
CIAL AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 348 (1988). The inability to stay abreast
of the literature is not merely a recent scientific phenomenon. Four decades ago, W.I.B. Bev-
eridge calculated that scientific periodicals were publishing "two million articles a year, or
40,000 a week, which reveals the utter impossibility of keeping abreast of more than the small
fraction of the literature which is most pertinent to one's interest." BEVERIDGE, supra note 3,
at 3.
41 HULL, supra note 40, at 394. See also TAUBES, supra note 33, at 426:
What cold fusion had proven, nonetheless, was that the nonexistence of a
phenomenon is by no means a fatal impediment to continued research. As long as
financial support could be found, the research would continue. And that support
might always be found so long as the researchers could obtain positive results. In
fact, the few researchers still working in the field would have little incentive to
acknowledge negative results as valid, because such recognition would only cut off
their funds.
Cf BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 65:
It is the originator who gets both the personal satisfaction and most of the credit if
his idea is proved correct, even if he does not do the work himself. A man working
on an hypothesis which is not his own often abandons it after one or two unsuc-
cessful attempts because he lacks the strong desire to confirm it which is necessary
to drive him to give it a thorough trial and think out all the possible ways of
varying the conditions of the experiment.
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with peer review and publication, can play a similar role. The extent
of a scientific consensus can help determine how thoroughly the testa-
ble propositions have been tested.
Science may become generally accepted because it has been pub-
lished, scrutinized by scientists, and found trustworthy. If so, general
acceptance speaks to a reliable methodology. But not all generally
accepted science falls into this category. Some science becomes ac-
cepted without publication and without significant scrutiny by the sci-
entific community. Information is passed from mentor to mentee or
between collaborators or through electronic mail. Methodologies dis-
tributed in these ways may become accepted without real communal
scrutiny. For example, a scientist may perform a particular technique
in a particular manner because she learned to do it that way while a
postdoctoral fellow. Another scientist may conduct an experiment in
a certain manner because a coauthor does it that way. The scientist
may be accepting the methodology not because she has closely ex-
amined and tested it, but instead because of the perceived authorita-
tive nature of its source.42
This kind of general acceptance, however, can also be an indica-
tor that a methodology is reliable, but only if the inherited technique
is actually used by many scientists, and it is the kind of technique
whose flaws would be revealed by widespread use.43 If such a tech-
nique, although seemingly accepted by many, is used by only a few or
its use is not likely to reveal its defects, then general acceptance of
42 Cf. KITCHER, supra note 22, at 306:
[W]e can distinguish three ways in which [reliance on authority] permeates the
cognitive lives of scientists. First, there is the general epistemic dependence on the
past that figures in everyone's early intellectual ontogeny .... Second, at the time
of entry into the scientific community, novices endorse a communitywide concep-
tion of legitimate epistemic authority. Certain people are to be trusted to decide
on certain issues, and the novice must accept whatever agreements they reach on
those issues. Third, during the course of individual research, scientists interact
with one another, adopting the claims made by some of their colleagues, investigat-
ing the proposals of others, ignoring the suggestions of yet others, when the claims,
proposals, and suggestions in question go beyond what is agreed upon by the perti-
nent community.
43 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31
EMORY L.J. 833, 846-52 (1982).
[A] new scientific procedure will normally go through a three-step process. ...
Suppose, for example, that some types of blindness are caused by tiny blood vessels
in the eyes wearing out and bursting .... A scientist ... [w]orking on animals ...
develops a laser surgery technique that he believes can stop the bleeding without
doing damage to the rest of the eyeball. He publishes his results.
Other eye specialists reading this report may be impressed by it, agree with
the theory behind it, and understand how the new procedure should alleviate the
condition. They would not yet, however, accept the procedure as reliable. In-
stead, verification through the use of controlled studies would next be required ...
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such a technique says nothing significant about the methodology's
reliability.
While general acceptance may indicate that the science has been
tested, lack of general acceptance has no singular meaning. The ab-
sence of acceptance may mean the scientific community has examined
the science and found it wanting. If so, opinions based on the science
should not be admitted. On the other hand, consensus may be absent
because the science has not been disseminated to the broader commu-
to see if the procedure worked the cure as claimed; and... to see if any limitations,
such as side-effects, could be discovered....
If the new procedure passed the controlled studies . . .. [t]he ultimate test
would be the actual use of the technique in general practice. Any limitations that
were not unearthed in the studies would surface as the procedure was used under
various circumstances. It might eventually be learned that while the surgery at
first seem to be successful with diabetics, after a year or so the blood vessels burst
again causing greater problems than before. Certainly, only when a procedure has
gone through these three steps-development of the methodology, verification of
the claimed results, and actual employment of the new technique-can the com-
munity of concerned scientists know both the procedure's reliability and its
limitations.
Id. at 846-47; see also MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 74 (1983) ("A scientific or professional field has a powerful
defense against unsubstantiated or exaggerated conclusions: replication. Professional/techni-
cal fields that apply such knowledge have a 'defense': erroneous principles will be found out
because patients will not get well, planes will not fly, or chemicals will not be synthesized.");
Patricia K. Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 82 (1988):
Replication of specific and detailed experiments is unlikely to repeat exactly what
was done before for well-known reasons: there is no professional incentive for a
"me-too" experiment. However, if replication is, as it should be, broadly con-
ceived to include the comparability of data from different laboratories, and build-
ing one experiment on the results and implications of a previous one, then
"replication" too has played a role in detecting apparent research fraud.
See also Thomas S. Burack, Note, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regula-
tory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 31-32 (1987) (quoting Stevan
Hamad, Creative Disagreement, 19 SCIENCES 18, 18 (1979)):
Peer interaction, in the form of repeating and building upon one another's experi-
ments, testing and elaborating one another's theories, and evaluating and criticiz-
ing one another's research, is the real medium for the self-corrective aspect of
science.
Cf. Peter J. Neufeld, Admissibility of New or Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, in
BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 80 (J. Ballantyne et al.
eds., 1989):
When a new nonforensic scientific hypothesis, instrument, or procedure is devel-
oped, it is first internally examined by blinded protocol. Once the creators are
satisfied with their data, the data are submitted for publication in peer review jour-
nals .... Once published, the concept is debated by others in the relevant fields.
Although other laboratories may attempt to replicate the results, this is not always
the case. Often the initial premise is relied upon to move into related areas of
experimentation. However, if there are any flaws or limitations in the initial find-
ings, they will inevitably be detected as the technique's use becomes widespread in
other controlled experiments.
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nity or because it is too new or too specific to have spread widely. If
so, the testimony can conceivably be admitted under Daubert, but
only if the trial court is convinced that any flaws in the methodology
have been exposed and corrected.
While general acceptance and peer review and publication may
help determine whether testimony is based on reliable science, an-
other Daubert factor hardly does. That "the court ordinarily should
consider ... the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation"' makes little sense, at least in the opaque
way presented by the Supreme Court. Abstract "standards" reveal
nothing about whether the science has been adequately tested. In-
stead, they are only of importance if they have a source in rigorous
testing. Standards must derive from testing to be meaningful; their
mere existence does not indicate anything about the adequacy of the
testing.
Scientifically sound standards, however, can help determine
whether the particular use of a technique was done in a scientific
manner. If the standards were derived from good science, then the
court should ask whether the standards have been followed. If not,
then the expert is unlikely to have based his testimony on a reliable
methodology.
D. Error Rate Factor
Finally, Daubert's error rate factor should be a crucial compo-
nent in the analysis of scientific evidence. No scientific test is perfect.
The potential for error exists in any measurement. Meaningful scru-
tiny of a technique should normally result in information about its
error rate. A technique with an unknown error rate in all likelihood
is a technique that has not been adequately tested.45 And if not ade-
quately tested, testimony based on it should not be admitted. Conse-
quently, the lack of error rate information indicates that the scientific
evidence should not be admitted.
Not all error rate data, however, should carry the same weight.
The information should be collected from the technique in actual use.
44 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
45 Cf TAUBES, supra note 33, at 321:
[I]n science ... the experimental measurement has not been invented that doesn't
come with some measurement error. Calculating and presenting the limits of error
in an experiment is usually taught in high school science classes. As E. Bright
Wilson put it bluntly in An Introduction to Scientific Research, "A measurement
whose accuracy is completely unknown has no use whatever. It is therefore neces-
sary to know how to estimate the reliability of experimental data and how to con-
vey this information to others."
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A theoretical or potential error rate has little meaning. Unfortu-
nately, the Daubert Court did not seem to understand this fact since it
referred to examination of "potential rate[s] of error .... 46 A relia-
ble scientific methodology is not one that theoretically works well; it
is one that actually works well. Knowledge of error rates empirically
derived from a technique's practical use is crucial. Repeatedly, labo-
ratory testing of a technique has indicated a flawless procedure while
real world uses have shown significant defects." The meaningful er-
ror rate is the one that has been derived from a rigorous study of the
technique's actual use, and the Daubert Court's indication that a trial
court should rely on theoretical rates is not helpful.
In sum, since the proponent of scientific testimony must establish
that the testimony is based on a reliable scientific methodology, a
court must determine whether that testimony is based on testable pro-
positions that have been rigorously tested. Tests with controls are the
norm. Peer review, publication, general acceptance, and error rates
can help a court determine whether the science has a solid empirical
base, but such factors should be examined only for what light they
shed on the controlling issue-whether the testable propositions have
been rigorously tested.
III. RELIABLE SCIENCE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
I have examined elsewhere problems of quality in forensic sci-
46 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
47 The fight to conquer tuberculosis demonstrated that treatments showing promise in the
laboratory did not always realize their potential in the real world. See FRANK RYAN, THE
FORGOTTEN PLAGUE: HOW THE BATTLE AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS WAS WON-AND LOST
(1993). For example, the initial trials for streptomycin showed a death rate one-third of that
resulting from a sanitorium regime.
But when another group of doctors analysed those same patients some five years
later, [they found that t]hirty-five of the original fifty-two patients denied the drug
were dead .... More disturbing was the fact that thirty-two of the original fifty-
five patients treated with streptomycin were also dead.
The conclusion was inescapable: few of the patients treated with streptomycin
had been cured by the drug. What it had achieved was a temporary reduction in
the severity of the disease.
Id. at 327 (footnote omitted). Compare Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99
F.R.D. 187, 228 (1983) (comments of Renee Fox):
[A wonder drug's] initial clinical trials and use typically receive great attention.
Its therapeutic efficacy and promise are stressed, with side effects and limitations
receiving scant attention. The next stage is characterized by increased awareness
of the agent's side effects and limitations, perhaps in a larger number of patients
with a wider range of attributes than initially suspected. The sequence often ad-
vances to the stage where more controlled doses of the drug are prescribed, for
particular patients under specified circumstances, to limit the possible side effects.
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ence.4' That examination demonstrated that little or no meaningful
testing has ever been performed on many forensic science proce-
dures.49 Little is also known about the true error rates for almost all
forensic science techniques. The few disclosed error rates, however,
are shockingly high.50 Most of forensic science operates outside of the
peer review systems, and forensic science is seldom published.51
While forensic science techniques are accepted in forensic science,
many are not accepted by a broader scientific community. 2 Further-
more, the techniques accepted in forensic science are not used in such
a way that would reveal their methodological flaws, if any. 3
In other words, if Daubert is taken seriously, then much of foren-
sic science is in serious trouble.
48 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV, J.L. &
TECH. 109 (1991).
49 Id. at 137-48.
50 Id. at 109-24.
51 Id. at 133-34.
52 Id. at 148-50.
53 Id. at 151-54.
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